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This image by Ommat News, entitled “Proxy War in Syria”, is a visual timeline of the Syrian conflict from March 2011 to 
August 2012 and is a good representation of the kind of media narratives coming out of Iran. While the emphasis is on 
the proxy nature of the conflict, other elements, such as the rise of radical Sunni Islamists, can be detected.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been the central 
 regional backer of the Bashar al-Assad regime since 
the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in March 2011. 
 Despite the importance of Iran in the drama unfolding in 
Syria, including any possible resolution to the conflict, 
the Iranian political elite’s perceptions of the Syrian 
civil war are arguably not well understood. This report 
 attempts to uncover these perceptions by analyzing the 
Iranian print news media and highlighting the dominant 
narratives. As one of the first systematic studies of 
Iranian media narratives on the Syrian civil war, this 
report can be an aid to policymakers,  academics, 
journalists and others in understanding the Iranian 
political elite’s thinking on this issue. 
KEY FINDINGS
• The Iranian political elite, despite public 
disagreements on a range of domestic and foreign 
policy issues, does not strongly diverge on support 
for Syria in public.
• The Syrian civil war is seen by the elite as a “proxy 
war” between two blocs: The al-Assad regime, Iran, 
Russia and China on the one hand and the Syrian 
opposition, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, the United 
States and the European Union on the other.
• There is anxiety among the elite about the rise of 
radical Sunni political Islam in Syria and concern 
that this will have a contagion effect on the rest of 
the Middle East. This anxiety signals that Iran is 
increasingly a status quo power in the region and 
may view the rise of radical Sunni Islam as one area 
of possible mutual interest between itself, the United 
States and the European Union. 
• There is little indication that the elite are considering 
withdrawing their support for the al-Assad regime. 
This appears to be in part because they believe 
that the rise of radical Sunni political Islam in Syria 
will lessen U.S. and E.U. enthusiasm for the Syrian 
opposition.
INTRODUCTION
The Syrian uprising began as a largely peaceful protest 
movement against the Ba’athist regime of Bashar al-
Assad in March 2011. Initially part of the revolutions 
sweeping across the Middle East during the Arab 
Spring, it has now devolved into a full-scale civil war. 
As of May 2013, the death toll was estimated at 80,000 
people.1 March saw heavy fighting between the regime 
and the opposition, and activists claimed that 6,000 
people were killed, the highest monthly death toll since 
the conflict began.2 Initiatives by the United Nations 
and the Arab League to reach a negotiated political 
settlement have come to naught. In fact, even as the 
Syrian regime and opposition continue fighting with no 
clear end in sight, the conflict has taken on regional 
and international dimensions, with local, regional and 
international actors arrayed on both sides. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran is the central regional 
actor on the side of the Syrian regime. Iran has a 
strong interest in keeping the regime in power and 
has consequently been among its strongest backers, 
providing it with a range of economic and military 
support.3 Despite the Islamic Republic’s key role in 
supporting the Syrian regime, the Iranian political 
elite’s perceptions of this momentous event are 
arguably not well understood. One of our best guides to 
understanding elite perceptions of the Syrian civil war 
may be the Iranian print news media. By analyzing the 
narratives offered of the Syrian civil war by Iranian print 
media sources with different political affiliations, we 
may be better able to understand the elite’s perceptions 
of the conflict. To this end, this report addresses the 
following two questions. First, what are the dominant 
narratives emerging from the Iranian print media on the 
Syrian civil war? Second, what can these narratives tell 
us about the perceptions of the conflict held by Iran’s 
political elite? 
This report identifies three dominant narratives. The 
first narrative is that there is an emerging proxy war 
between regional and international blocs consisting of 
the Syrian regime, Iran, Russia and China on one side 
and the Syrian opposition, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, 
the United States and the European Union on the other. 
The second narrative raises the specter of the spread 
of radical Sunni political Islam in the MENA region, 
asserting that the support of regional and international 
states for the Syrian opposition is fueling this trend. 
The third narrative alleges a Western propaganda 
campaign against the al-Assad regime. While other 
narratives exist in the print media, no others appear as 
consistently over time. The persistence of these three 
1 Nichols, Michelle. “Syria Death Toll at Least 80,000, Says U.N. 
General Assembly President.” Reuters. N.p., 15 May 2013. On-
line. Accessed. 11 June 2013.
2 Owen, Paul. “’6,000 Killed’ in Bloodiest Month for Syria Crisis - 
Tuesday 2 April.” The Guardian. 02 Apr. 2013. Online. Accessed 
03 June 2013.
3 Charbonneau, Louis. “Exclusive: Iran Steps up Weapons Lifeline 
to Syria’s Assad.” Reuters. 14 Mar. 2013. Online. Accessed 03 
June 2013.
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narratives across time and sources could potentially tell 
us a number of things about perceptions of the Syrian 
civil war among the elite. First, the predominance of 
these three narratives could be interpreted as a sign 
that the elite are united in their perceptions of the 
Syrian civil war. At the same time, however, it could 
be a symptom of the limited freedom of the press and 
the state-centric nature of print media in Iran, which 
severely constrains the expression of differences 
among the elite and, indeed, in society more broadly. 
This limitation could create the illusion that the elite are 
united in their perceptions of the Syrian civil war when 
in fact they are not. Second, the Islamic Republic’s 
concerns over the rise of radical Sunni political Islam 
may be a sign that Iran is increasingly transitioning from 
an anti-status quo power to a status quo power in the 
region and may have a shared interest with the United 
States and the European Union in stemming the tide of 
extremism. Iran’s concerns could have important long-
term implications if radical Sunnis become ascendant in 
the region. However, it appears unlikely to translate into 
a serious willingness to pursue a political compromise 
with the West over Syria in the short term. 
This report is divided into five parts. Part One explains 
the basic framework of the report, including the 
methodology, classification of the Iranian political elite 
and sources used. Part Two gives a brief historical 
background on the Iranian print media since 1979. Part 
Three draws a brief outline of Iran-Syria relations since 
1979. Part Four lays out the three main narratives 
observed in the Iranian media since the start of 
the Syrian conflict in March 2011. The conclusion 
discusses what these narratives can tell us about the 
elite’s perceptions of the Syrian conflict. 
PART ONE: FRAMEWORK
Methodology 
This report seeks to understand the Iranian political 
elite’s perceptions of the Syrian civil war through the 
Iranian print news media. To this end, six Iranian print 
media sources representing each major political current 
in the Islamic Republic were analyzed. The hypothesis 
was that Iranian print media provide a narrow but 
reliable lens to the Iranian political elite’s perception of 
the Syrian civil war. This segment of the Iranian media 
was chosen for a number of reasons. First, television 
and radio inside Iran have a greater degree of central 
government control than print outlets and they may 
thus be less representative of the range of views within 
the elite. Furthermore, only some television and radio 
programs are consistently archived online, making them 
difficult to use for systematic multi-source research. 
This report has thus focused on print media, including 
news websites, which can be readily accessed online 
and are thus more amenable to analysis over time. 
The main criteria for selecting sources were that (1) 
they represent the views of one of the political currents 
outlined below; (2) they publish high quality content 
that could be accessed online; and (3) they publish 
content frequently. The sources used in this study 
were considered to best meet these three criteria. 
International broadcasters, including those funded 
and operated by the United States (VOA Persian, RL/
RFE, Radio Farda), Great Britain (BBC Persian) and 
Germany (Deutsche Welle Persian) were excluded 
because they are not seen as reflecting the views of the 
elite. In addition, social media sources were excluded 
because of low quality, infrequency of publication and 
difficulties in tracking narratives over time.  Finally, 
when sources appeared in multiple languages 
(including English), only Farsi articles from the sources 
were used to maintain consistency. 
After identifying the sources to be studied, the search 
function was used on the websites of each source 
to look for articles, the main keyword being “Syria.” 
Articles across all of the sources’ web archives were 
analyzed for narratives by looking at the headlines 
and content of articles. News articles, editorials and 
op-eds were included in the analysis. A narrative can 
be expressed without explicit editorializing: The choice 
of a quote, especially from an Iranian or non-Iranian 
figure or major Western media source, can be a way 
of stating the narrative. Narratives repeated more than 
once by at least five out of the six selected sources 
were then selected for further analysis as dominant 
narratives that may represent the elite’s perceptions 
on the Syrian conflict. Three such narratives emerged. 
These are presented in Part Four of this report.4
Classification of the Iranian 
Political Elite & Print Media 
Sources
The following classification of the Iranian political elite 
into “political currents” is derived from IranPolitik: The 
Iranian Political Analysis Project’s classification system 
developed for the 2013 Iranian presidential election.5 
Groupings in the Islamic Republic’s political system are 
notoriously difficult to ascertain and categorize because 
of the system’s opacity, lack of a strong party system, 
focus on powerful personalities, and shifting nature 
4  Appendix A lists a sample of more than 40 citations of articles 
from the selected sources that illustrate the dominant narratives
5 “2013 Iranian Presidential Election Khamenei Ahmadinejad 
Khatami.” IranPolitik. 5 Jan. 2013. Online. Accessed 03 June 
2013.
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of allegiances. There is limited consensus on Iranian 
currents’ key characteristics and even their names. As 
such, some level of interpretation is required. The only 
deviation here from standard classification frameworks 
of Iranian political currents is that the Principalists, 
Iran’s ruling conservatives, are divided into three 
distinct currents based on divisions that have emerged 
since 2009.
The table below illustrates each source analyzed in this 
report alongside their relevant political current. Given 
the dominance of the Neo-Principalists over every facet 
of Iran’s political system today,6 it is represented by two 
sources to account for its importance among the elite. 
The Green Movement has been excluded because it is 
no longer part of the regime elite.
6  Thaler, David E. et  al. Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Ex-
ploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2010. Print.
Political Current Description Print Media Source
Neo-Principalist The most powerful current in the Islamic Republic is that of the 
hardliners, referred to here as the Neo-Principalists. One of the 
central principles of this current is velayat madari, or obedience to 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Alongside the Supreme 
Leader, the main backer of this group is the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC), the most powerful social, political, economic 
and security complex in Iran. The Neo-Principalists are opposed 
to every other current in Iran’s political establishment to varying 
degrees. This current originally backed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for 
president in 2005 until his re-election in 2009. They were central to 
his first term as president in terms of both policy and the provision 
of key cabinet members, but broke with the president after 2009 
for reasons explored below. The key personalities include ex-
parliamentary Speaker Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel (who is also well 
regarded by Traditional Principalists); Supreme National Security 
Council Secretary and Chief Nuclear Negotiator Saeed Jalili; former 
Interior Minister Sadegh Mahsouli; Persevering Front of the Islamic 
Revolution (PFIR) parliamentary faction Secretary Morteza Agha-
Tehrani; and parliamentary representative Ruhollah Hosseinian. 
The main spiritual leader of this current is the controversial cleric 
Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi. In the Iranian parliament 
this current is represented by the PFIR.
Kayhan Daily Newspaper: Kayhan 
is a daily morning and evening 
newspaper that is part of the 
government-owned Kayhan 
Foundation and Kayhan media 
complex. Kayhan’s editor-in-chief 
Hossein Shariatmadari was directly 
appointed by Iranian Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 
leading many to believe that 
Kayhan directly represents the 
Supreme Leader’s point of view.7
Fars News Agency: FNA is an 
online-only print media source 
closely linked with the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). 
The IRGC is one of Khamenei’s 
most important instruments of 
power and is believed to share the 
Supreme Leader’s views.8
Ahmadinejad-
Mashaei Current
Once virtually indistinguishable from the Neo-Principalists to 
outside observers, this current came to light after the 2009 
presidential election with the rise of its most notable figure (aside 
from president Ahmadinejad), Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei. Mashaei 
has been labeled “the octopus” because of his appointment to 
multiple senior posts by the president, including as presidential 
chief of staff. This current has dominated Ahmadinejad’s second 
term (2009-2013). Its unorthodox points of view on domestic 
and foreign policy have led Neo-Principalists and others to label 
them the “deviant current.” Ahmadinejad has angered some 
hardliners by questioning the need for the police to crack down 
on young people for the way they dress, saying that the country 
has larger problems. Mashaei has said that the age of political 
Islam as it exists today is over, and that the time is ripe for an 
“Iranian school of Islam.” The pair has also highlighted Iran’s pre-
Islamic history and attempted to reconcile Iranian nationalism 
with Shiite political Islam. Their rhetoric on the return of the Mahdi 
and the end times has also raised suspicions among hardliners 
who see this as undermining the Islamic Republic’s main political 
theory, the velayat-e faghih. Finally, although Ahmadinejad is 
known outside Iran as anti-Israel and anti-American, Mashaei 
has said that Iranians have no problem with the people of Israel 
and Ahmadinejad himself has often taken a reconciliatory tone 
toward the United States post-2009. Aside from Ahmadinejad 
and Mashaei, presidential adviser Hamid Baghaei is another key 
individual in this current.  
Islamic Republic News Agency: 
IRNA is an online-only print media 
source directly controlled by the 
presidential administration in 
power.  Today it represents the 
views of the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei 
Current.9
7 Slackman, Michael. “Freed by Revolution, He Speaks for Iran’s Hard-Liners.” The New York Times. 22 Sept. 2007. Online. Accessed 03 June 
2013.
8 Ghazi, Fereshteh. “The Islamic Republic’s Most Distinguished Media is running by Military Forces. (Resaneh-ye Bartar- Jomhuri-e Eslami 
Tavassot-e Nezamian Edareh Mishavad).” Rooz.  26 Oct. 2009. Online. Accessed 03 June 2013.
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Traditional 
Principalists
A current rooted in the Islamist right during the first decade after 
the revolution, this group as it exists today emerged as a reaction 
to the victory of Mohammad Khatami and the Reformists in the 
1997 presidential election. Traditional Principalists have stronger 
ties with the Centrist current than the Neo-Principalists and the 
Ahmadinejad-Mashaei current, and also have deep ties to the 
bazaar, a historically important social and economic force in Iran. 
Although conservative, they are more moderate than the Neo-
Principalists, and since 2009 the Traditional Principalists have 
often found themselves at odds with Neo-Principalist hardliners. 
This current contains a number of senior political figures, including 
parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani and Tehran mayor Mohammad-
Bagher Ghalibaf, as well as more independent figures such as 
parliamentarians Mohammad-Reza Bahonar and Ahmad Tavakoli. 
Mehr News Agency: MNA is an 
online-only mass media outlet 
that can be said to represent the 
views of all Principalists, although 
Traditional Principalists have a 
particularly strong presence.10
Centrists Another current rooted in the Islamic right during the first decade 
of the revolution, the Centrists emerged under the leadership of 
one of the regime’s most powerful and enduring politicians, former 
president Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and were in 
power between 1989 and 1997. The current retains some support 
in the Iranian parliament today. Its past platform emphasized 
economic reform (tending toward free markets) and led the charge 
during the Reconstruction Era to recover the economy after the 
Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). This current has received strong 
support from technocrats and entrepreneurs in the past. Alongside 
Hashemi-Rafsanjani, former chief nuclear negotiator Hassan 
Rowhani is a well-known Centrist figure. 
Iranian Labour News Agency: ILNA 
is an online-only print media source 
run by the House of Labour, the 
regime’s official labour union. It is 
associated with moderates in the 
Centrist and Reformist political 
currents.11
Reformists This current emerged from the Islamic left during the first decade 
after the revolution. In its second incarnation, after a sweeping 
victory in the 1997 presidential election, it emphasized social and 
political reforms and attempted to liberalize Iranian society and 
the political system. Although this current had significant political 
clout between 1997 and 2005, and was seen as having governed 
well during its tenure, it ultimately failed to make reforms a lasting 
reality and has been systematically swept from power since. 
Members of this current particularly failed in supporting social 
forces, such as students and women, who made their electoral 
victories possible. It is now becoming a marginal player within the 
Islamic Republic’s political establishment. Key Reformist figures 
include former President Khatami, Ayatollah Mohammad Mousavi-
Khoeiniha and former Interior minister Abdollah Nouri, among 
others.
Shargh Newspaper: Shargh is a 
daily newspaper associated with 
the Reformist current.12
Green Movement The Green Movement, originally a political movement that 
emerged and was active between April 2009 and February 2011 
and had the support of the majority of Reformists, is no longer 
active. The Green Movement in Iran today consists of more radical 
Reformists, led by the imprisoned Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi 
Karroubi, many of whom are in exile. While there is likely much 
sympathy in Iranian society toward this current, there appears 
to be no organized political support for it inside Iran, as much 
of its organized social base was crushed in the aftermath of the 
controversial 2009 election. The Green Movement is well outside 
the Iranian political elite, and print media associated with it are not 
examined in this report.  
9 RNA will be under the supervision of the Presidency. (IRNA Zir-e Nazar-e Riasat-e Jomhuri Gharar Migirad).” BBC Persian. BBC, 31 July 2010. 
Online. Accessed 03 June 2013. At the time of publication (during the 2013 Iranian presidential election), IRNA has been taken offline, possibly 
as a political attack on the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei Current, and many of the sources used here cannot be retrieved. Dead URLs are a common 
problem when studying Iran using online sources based inside the Islamic Republic. As a countermeasure, the author has archived articles 
used in this report that were still working at the time of publication. The articles cited from IRNA and one article from Khabar Online, however, 
were inaccessible. The reason for this, at this point, is unclear: It could be due to either technical or political reasons. All other sources are 
archived with the author in .pdf format should they become inaccessible in the future. 
10 “About Us - Mehr News Agency.” Mehr News Agency. n.d. Online. Accessed 03 June 2013.
11 “About ILNA (Darbareh ILNA).” Iranian Labour News Agency. n.d. Online. Accessed 03 June 2013.
12 Kamali Dehghan, Saeed. “Ahmadinejad Ally Jailed and Reformist Daily Closed in Iranian Power Struggle.” The Guardian.  27 Sept. 2012. 
Online. Accessed 03 June 2013.
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PART TWO: BRIEF HISTORY 
OF IRANIAN MEDIA SINCE 
1979
To uncover the Iranian political elite’s perceptions on 
the Syrian civil war from March 2011 to March 2013 
through dominant narratives, it helps to understand 
the historical context, legacies and contemporary 
characteristics of Iranian print news media. The 
triumph of the Islamic Revolution marked the beginning 
of one of the most repressive periods in Iranian media 
history, persisting to the current day. Although the 
media opened up significantly immediately following 
the Pahlavi regime thanks to revolutionary chaos, as 
the Islamist forces under the direction of the Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini consolidated power, the opening 
rapidly disappeared and media diversity was reduced 
to the range of views that existed among the Islamists 
themselves. For example, the popular daily Ayandegan 
was famously closed for good after surviving a number 
of attacks by the ancien regime when Khomeini 
declared: “I do not read Ayandegan.”13
As part of the mass nationalization of the economy 
in the early years of the revolution, nearly all media 
came into the direct hands of the state. Ettela’at and 
Kayhan, bastions of the private media during the 
Pahlavi dynasty, became two of the most powerful 
state media complexes, directly airing the views of 
Iran’s powerful Supreme Leaders and their associates. 
It is even rumored that some Ettela’at editorials have 
been penned by current Supreme Leader Khamenei 
himself. In this sense, much of Iran’s print media is 
an extension of the regime and elite. Media diversity, 
insofar as it exists, is confined to the political currents 
within the regime. The system of censorship set up by 
the Pahlavi dynasty has been reproduced in the Islamic 
Republic, and includes monitoring of what is written 
in the print news media as well as preemptive gag 
orders issued regularly on sensitive dates and topics. 
Finally, while there was somewhat more freedom 
under the Pahlavi regime to deal with social issues 
such as women’s rights, the Iranian media today are 
more restricted in this regard because of the regime’s 
socially conservative Islamic discourse.
Media and politics intersect in a significant way in the 
Islamic Republic. The most well-known contemporary 
example of this includes the 18 Tir student uprising 
of 1999.14 This uprising had its roots a decade earlier, 
when a number of paradigmatic changes began 
the process of fundamental transformations. The 
end of the revolutionary crisis, the bloody Iran-Iraq 
War (1980-1988), and the death of the charismatic 
Khomeini created the circumstances for great social, 
economic and political change in Iran. After ten years 
of revolutionary terror and war, civil society started 
becoming active once again. In 1997 Mohammad 
Khatami, a mid-level cleric who had represented 
Khomeini at Kayhan soon after the revolution and held 
a number of other senior appointments, was elected 
as president in a landslide victory. Under the Khatami 
administration, Iran witnessed the “Press Spring,” in 
which print media flourished, as well as a larger opening 
that touched every field of intellectual life.15 Halfway 
in Khatami’s first term, Iran’s conservative dominated 
Fifth Parliament (1996-2000) sought to make Iran’s 
Press Law, which placed limitations on freedom of the 
press, even more restrictive as an attack on Khatami’s 
reforms. 
In the ensuing political battle over the Press Law, the 
pro-Reformist Salam daily newspaper published a top-
secret internal memo from the Ministry of Intelligence 
and Security (abbreviated as VEVAK in Farsi) that set 
off a chain of events leading to a political crisis. The 
VEVAK memo, originally sent by Deputy Intelligence 
Minister Saeed Emami (who would later be disgraced 
over his involvement in the Chain Murders and “commit 
suicide”)16 to then Intelligence Minister Ghorban-Ali 
Dorri-Najafabadi on 8 October 1998, outlined Emami’s 
support for a more restrictive Press Law. By linking 
conservatives seeking a more restrictive Press Law 
to a despised figure like Emami, Salam had hoped 
to smear them. For the crime of publishing a VEVAK 
top-secret internal memo, Salam was shut down. This 
pushed Khatami supporters, particularly university 
students, to rise up in what became known as the 18 
Tir uprising in 1999. The mass repression that followed 
helped close the political opening Khatami had helped 
13  Ghaed, Mohammad. “Electrocution 1: Regarding the Publication 
Ban on Ayandegan Newspaper (10-12 May1979) (Barghge-
reftegi 1 : Darbareh-ye Tavaghof-e Enteshar-e Ruznameh-ye 
Ayandegan (21-23 Ordibehesht 1358)).” Mohammad Ghaed. 
Nov. 2010. Online. Accessed 03 June 2013.
14 “Six Days That Shook Iran.” BBC. 11 July 2000. Online. Accessed 
03 June 2013.
15 Samii, A. W. ““Sisyphus’ Newsstand: The Iranian Press under 
Khatami.” Middle East Review of International Affairs 5.3 (2001): 
1-11. Print.
16 The Chain Murders are alleged to have been a VEVAK operation 
to assassinate Iranian political activists and intellectuals between 
November and December 1998. This was seen as being part of 
a larger operation going back a decade which targeted political 
activists at home and abroad. Although VEVAK denied respon-
sibility by claiming that Emami had gone rogue, suspicions 
regarding its culpability remain. 
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create. The repression included a mass order, the first 
of its kind, by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 
to close a number of Reformist-oriented newspapers.17
Iranian print media today has a number of characteristics. 
First, much of print media content now appears both 
on newsstands and online. In fact, some of the most 
prominent print media do not even publish physical 
newspapers, but only appear online. Second, cyber 
spaces in general and social media specifically have 
changed the print media by allowing non-state media 
to expand content and readership to new heights. Still, 
with few exceptions the quality of this media leaves 
much to be desired. The most high quality non-regime 
media are by foreign governments, the best example 
being BBC Persian.18 The implementation of a plan, 
begun in September 2012, to create a “national intranet” 
that could in the long term cut the average Iranian off 
from cyberspace could potentially cut Iranians off from 
most if not all non-regime media.19 Finally, despite the 
severe limitations on Iran’s media, within the ruling 
Principalists (from which nearly all major power-holders 
in the Islamic Republic today hail) there is a surprisingly 
diverse and dynamic media. These media outlets are 
often linked to key state institutions, political currents 
or figures but still manage to produce interesting, 
informative and diverse content. Understanding the 
limited freedom of the press and the regime-centric 
nature of print media in Iran allows us to expect with 
some confidence that our analysis of the sources is a 
good guide to the understanding the Iranian political 
elite’s perceptions of the Syrian civil war. 
PART THREE: IRAN-SYRIA 
RELATIONS SINCE 1979
An understanding of Iran-Syria relations since 1979 is 
important for properly contextualizing Iranian print media 
narratives on the Syrian civil war. According to Jubin 
Goodarzi, a foremost scholar on Iran-Syria relations: 
“[T]he Syrian-Iranian axis is one of the most intriguing 
developments in modern Middle East politics...Pointing 
to many differences in their respective ideologies, as 
well as their social and political foundations, most 
analysts expressed surprise at how a revolutionary, 
pan-Islamic theocracy like Iran could form an alliance 
with a secular, pan-Arab socialist republic like Syria.”20 
Perhaps counter-intuitively, Goodarzi argues that it is 
precisely this lack of overlap in ideological claims as 
well as strategic priorities (the Levant for Syria and the 
Persian Gulf for Iran) that has made the three decade 
long Iran-Syria alliance one of the most enduring in 
the modern Middle East. He identifies this alliance to 
be primarily defensive with limited offensive capability, 
focused on opponents such as Israel in the Levant, 
Iraq under Saddam Hussein and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) in the Persian Gulf, and the United 
States in the wider region (one may want to now add 
Turkey to this list).21
Following the events of 11 September 2001 and the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the Iran-Syria alliance has 
formed the core of what the Islamic Republic calls 
the “axis of resistance,” a loose partnership that also 
includes Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the 
Gaza Strip. Given Iran’s lack of land routes to the latter 
two allies and its limited naval capabilities, Syria is 
essential to Iran’s power projection in the Levant. This, 
alongside the fact that Syria is one of the few countries 
in the region not strategically aligned with the United 
States, has meant that the Islamic Republic does not 
see what is happening in Syria as part of the Arab 
Spring (which the regime views as an Iranian-inspired 
“Islamic Awakening”) but instead as a Western-backed 
attempt to unravel the axis of resistance.22 The Iran-
Syria alliance can lead us to expect that the Iranian 
print media’s narratives will generally be positive 
toward Syria, especially given the regime’s close ties 
with media. This alliance also leads us to expect that 
dominant narratives will likely revolve around strategic 
regional and international issues. 
PART FOUR: DOMINANT 
MEDIA NARRATIVES
The dominant narratives examined here mainly began 
appearing around March 2012, a full year after the start 
of the Syrian conflict. This is not to say that no narratives 
existed prior to this, but that consistent narratives on 
the Syrian conflict expressed over a long period in the 
Iranian print media are a more recent phenomenon. A 
similar pattern can be seen with other major domestic 
and foreign policy issues. For example, for months 
after the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan uprisings 
beginning in late 2010 and early 2011, the Iranian print 
media covered much of what was happening but did 
not necessarily have a coherent narrative. Eventually, 
the idea that these uprisings were an Iranian-inspired 
17  Samii, “Sisyphus’ Newsstandi”.
18 BBC Persian Homepage. BBC, n.d. Online. Accessed 03 June 
2013.
19  Rhoads, Christopher, and Farnaz Fassihi. “Iran Vows to Unplug 
Internet.” The Wall Street Journal. 19 Dec. 2011. Online. Ac-
cessed 03 June 2013.
20  Goodarzi, Jubin. Syria and Iran. London: Tauris Academic Stud-
ies, 2006. Print. 7. 
21  Ibid, 10. 
22  Peterson, Scott. “Iran’s Khamenei Praises Egyptian Protesters, 
Declares ‘Islamic Awakening’” The Christian Science Monitor. 04 
Feb. 2011. Online. Accessed 03 June 2013.
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“Islamic Awakening” was passed down by the Supreme 
Leader and Iran’s senior political leadership and has 
now become the dominant narrative on what we call the 
Arab Spring. This tendency goes back to the country’s 
limited press freedom and the regime-centric nature 
of the Iranian print media. Once the regime has made 
up its mind about an issue, the narrative is passed 
down from the regime leadership through the media, 
although depending on the issue room for divergence 
from these narratives may exist. These dominant 
narratives are often but not always expressed through 
speeches by Khamenei and other senior figures. The 
three dominant narratives found are presented below. 
Narrative One: Proxy War in 
Syria 
One of the most prominent narratives to emerge from 
the Iranian print media regarding the Syrian civil war is 
that the conflict is in reality a “proxy war” and possibly 
a blueprint for a new Cold War between emerging 
international and regional blocs. This narrative portrays 
the conflict between the predominantly Alawite regime 
of Bashar al-Assad and the predominantly Sunni 
opposition as being a proxy conflict on two levels: first, 
on the regional level, as a proxy for the conflict between 
Iran and the resistance on the one hand and Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and Turkey on the other; and second, 
on the international level, as a proxy for the conflict 
between China and Russia on the one hand and the 
United States and the European Union on the other. 
The earliest source found for this narrative is in June 
2012 and the narrative has continued up to the present. 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been one 
of the main sources of this narrative, as demonstrated 
by a speech that was carried in two separate articles by 
Mehr News Agency: 
The bitter truth about Syria is that a group of 
states have pushed anti-Syrian government 
forces into a proxy war on behalf of themselves, 
and this proxy war is the reality of today’s Syria 
crisis. These [same] governments who have 
started a proxy war on Syria, prevented Mr. Kofi 
Anna’s plan from working and did not allow this 
plan to achieve results”23
The reality of Syria’s issues is: A proxy war with 
the Syrian government on the part of some 
governments and with the leadership of America 
to meet interests of the Zionist regime and strike 
a blow against the [axis of] resistance in the 
region. In the middle, the Syrian people have 
been ignored and have been sacrificed, and this 
situation must stop as soon as possible.24
This narrative has also been advanced in a number 
of editorials by Hossein Shariatmadari, the Khamenei 
appointed editor-in-chief of Kayhan Newspaper, 
including the following passage: 
Remembered witnesses, and many other 
witnesses, do not leave any doubt that Turkey, 
on behalf of America and Israel, and with the 
dollars of al-Saud and Qatar, has been drawn 
into a proxy war. A war whose end can be 
predicted now [and shall end with] a heavy price 
and downfall for the Erdogan government...25
More recently, Khamenei’s representative in Syria, 
Mojtaba Hosseini, has repeated this line of thinking, 
saying:  “The battles and insecurity by militant and 
terrorist groups in Syria in reality is a proxy war by 
America and the regime occupying Jerusalem [Israel] 
and some seditious Arab countries for revenge for 
Syria’s resistance [to Israel].”26
Senior government officials have not been the only 
ones to advance this narrative. According to Hossein 
Zahmatkesh, a professor of international relations at 
the University of Tehran:
In fact the situation in Syria is the best example 
of a phenomenon which is known as proxy war 
in international relations: A war whose outcome 
can lead to the reshaping of the situation of 
many of the regional and international players 
23  “The Leader of the Revolution’s Words in 18 One-on-One 
meetings with the Heads of the Non-Aligned Movement (Bay-
anat-e Rahbar Enghelab Dar 18 Didadar-e Dojanebeh Ba 
Saran-e Jonbesh-e Adam-e Ta’ahod).” KHAMENEI.IR. 04 Sept. 
2012. Online. Accessed 03 June 2013. and; “Meeting between 
head of the United Nations with the supreme leader. (Didar-e 
Dabir-e Koll-e Sazeman-e Melal-e Motahed ba Rahbar-e Moaz-
zam-e Enghelab).” Mehr News Agency.  29 Aug. 2012. Online. 
Accessed 03 June 2013.
24    “Supreme leader of the revolution meets with Iraq’s prime min-
ister: Non-aligned Movement must enter on the topic of Syria. 
(Rahbar-e Moazzam- Enghelab dar Didar-e Nakhost Vazir-e 
Aragh: Jonbesh Gheir-e Moteahed-ha bayad dar Mozu-e Su-
rieh Vorud Konad).” Iranian Labour News Agency. 31 Aug. 
2012. Online. Accessed 03 June 2013.
25 Shariatmadari, Hossein. “Do not get Wine from this Grape (Az 
in Angur Sharab Nagirid).” Kayhan. 08 Sept. 2012. Online. Ac-
cessed 03 June 2013.
26 “The Representative of the Supreme Leader in Syria: The Bat-
tles and Insecurity in Syria Is a Proxy War (Namayandeh-ye 
Rahbar-e Moazam Enghelab Dar Surieh: Dargiri Va Na Amniha-
ye Surieh Jang-e Niabati Ast).” Islamic Republic News Agency. 
7 Jan. 2013. Online. Accessed 03 June 2013.
Page 12
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC’S POLITICAL ELITE & SYRIA   JUNE 2013
and even to some extent impact the geopolitical 
development of the international scene.27
Narrative Two: The Spread of 
Radical Sunni Political Islam in 
the MENA Region
The second dominant narrative warns of the spread 
of radical Sunni political Islam in the Middle East (the 
terms “Wahabism” and “Salafism” are often used in 
this regard). Although the Islamic Republic practices a 
form of political Islam, it has historically been hostile 
to some Sunni versions of political Islam. In fact, 
despite espousing a form of Islamic universalism, the 
Islamic Republic has cynically ignored Islamic causes 
when it is convenient. For example, despite anti-
Islamic Chinese and Russian policies that that have 
resulted in the deaths of thousands of Muslims in those 
countries, Iran has nonetheless retained close ties with 
these governments while simultaneously condemning 
American policies in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Syria 
itself, the Iranian government largely ignored the Hafez 
al-Assad regime’s slaughter of thousands of Syrian 
Muslim Brothers during the 1980s because the Syrian 
government provided Iran with crucial military and 
diplomatic aid during the Iran-Iraq War. 
This dominant narrative has at least two characteristics. 
First, it views the spread of groups espousing radical 
Sunni Islamism as a cancer in the region and a disaster 
for the Islamic ummah (community). Second, the 
narrative attacks the United States and its allies for 
supporting radical Sunni Islamists that Iran believes 
will, once in power, quickly turn against their backers. 
This narrative recalls memories of the Western and 
Saudi-backed anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan and the 
rise of the Taliban. The most interesting example of this 
narrative in the sources examined in this study was the 
coverage of Syrian Prime Minister Wader Nader al-
Halghi’s speech at the Non-Aligned Movement summit 
on 30 August 2012, which briefly addressed the threat. 
Al-Halghi stated, “It has become clear that foreign-
backed terrorist groups have abused this crisis and 
are killing innocent people. Between [these groups] 
there are Salafi and Takfiri al-Qaeda individuals.”28 
Despite being a small point in al-Halghi’s speech, it 
was highlighted by Iran’s print media.
As reports of radical Sunni Islamist groups gaining 
strength in Syria proliferate, this narrative has gathered 
momentum. Avaz Heydarpour, member of the Iranian 
parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy 
commission, stated in an interview with Mehr News 
Agency that: 
The efforts of the West and countries allied to 
the West in the region is to start a fight between 
Shi’as and Sunnis, which of course they have 
not been successful in doing, and for this reason 
they try to activate groups like the Taliban...29
A more recent article by Fars News Agency took on 
this subject by referencing an attack on Syrians in Iraq 
by what it claimed was the al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorist 
group. According to the article, this signifies that radical 
Sunni groups in different countries, who want to found 
states based on their own interpretation of Shari’a 
law, are on the rise in the region, leaving footprints 
everywhere including Iraq, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Jordan, Lebanon and Libya. Citing the killing 
of the U.S. ambassador in Libya, the article maintains 
that these groups have aspirations beyond any one 
state and will eventually target Western interests and 
the West itself: 
The extremist Salafist-Jihadist current which 
is gaining force in the region and under the 
name of the Free Syrian Army, the Free Iraqi 
Army, Jebhet al-Nusrat, Ahrar al-Sham etc., by 
securing its position in Syria will not remain idle 
and will challenge the entire region and will suck 
the rulers of the countries who support them into 
a tornado as well…America which has nurtured 
this [radical Sunni] current, during the Benghazi 
conflicts in which America’s ambassador in Libya 
was killed, was not able to remain safe from the 
venomous sting of the serpent that it nurtured in 
its own midst. And French officials also did not 
imagine that someday they would have to take 
action against those they themselves raised.30
27   Zahmatkesh, Hossein. “The goals of regional and international 
powers in the proxy war in Syria. (Ahdaf-e Ghodrat-haye Man-
tagheh-yi va Beinolmelali dar Jang-e Niabati-e Surieh).” Fars 
News Agency, 20 Oct. 2012. Online. Accessed 03 June 2013.
28 “Wael Al-Halghi, Syrian Prime Minister at the Tehran [NAM] 
Summit: Some Countries Are Causing a Crisis in Syria/Salaf-
ists and Al-Qaeda Are Killing People (Wael Al-Halghi Nakhost 
Vazir-e Surieh Dar Ejlas-e Tehran: Barkhi Keshvarha Amel-e 
Bohran Dar Surieh Hastand / Salafiha Va Al-Ghaedeh Mardom 
Ra Mikoshand).”Fars News Agency. 30 Aug. 2012. Online. Ac-
cessed 03 June 2013.
29   “Heydarpour in a Conversation with Mehr: Salafis in the Re-
gion/Turkey and Qatar Play in NATO’s Puzzle (Heydarpour Dar 
Goftogu Ba Mehr: Salafiha Dar Mantagheh / Turkieh Va Qatar 
Dar Puzzle-e Nato Bazi Mikonand).” Mehr News Agency. 27 
Jan. 2013. Online. Accessed 03 June 2013.
30 “What Will the Extremist Salafi Current in Syria Do after Con-
solidating Itself in Syria (Jaryan-e Salafi Tondro Pas Az Tasbit-e 
Khod Ba Mantagheh Che Khahand Kard).” Fars News Agency. 
6 Mar. 2013. Online. Accessed 03 June 2013.
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Narrative Three: Western 
 Propaganda against the 
 Regime of Bashar al-Assad
The third and final dominant narrative accuses the 
Western media of carrying out a propaganda campaign 
against the al-Assad regime, and by extension Iran. 
It also claims that the Syrian regime continues to be 
legitimate and popular among the Syrian people. 
For example, the Iranian media take opportunities to 
highlight pro-regime demonstrations as evidence of 
Western deception, as in the case of an interview with 
a member of the Iranian parliament’s National Security 
and Foreign Policy commission: 
[D]espite the poisonous propaganda of the West 
and the distortion of the truth everyone has seen 
that 15 million out of Syria’s 25 million people 
come out to demonstrate in favor of their legal 
government and have shown the falseness of 
Western-backed media outlets.31
Iran’s ambassador to Syria, Mohammad-Reza Raouf-
Sheibani, is another figure cited by the Iranian print 
media to express this narrative. In an article by IRNA 
he is quoted as dividing the international media into 
two camps, one that he claims reflects reality and 
another that is biased and works for “American-Zionist” 
interests. Speaking about the latter, he stated that: 
Biased media have an important role in the 
[Syrian] events and instead of directing public 
opinion in a correct direction, by provoking it 
they direct the region toward disagreement and 
conflict, and this [biased] media’s share in the 
tragedies in the region cannot be denied.32
The Iranian print media particularly love to highlight 
Western social, political, economic and media figures 
who repeat their narrative. This was demonstrated 
by the wide coverage given to criticisms by Amber 
Lyon, a disenchanted former CNN reporter, whose 
documentary on the Bahraini government’s crackdown 
on pro-democracy demonstrators was canned by 
CNN. According to a Lyon quote carried in Mehr News 
Agency, “American networks are constantly showing 
evil and negative images from Iran and Syria.”33 What 
is particularly interesting about Mehr News Agency’s 
coverage of Lyon’s criticisms is that although images of 
women, especially without the hijab, are often excluded 
from domestic Iranian media, in this case Lyon’s 
picture, with full-length flowing blond hair, slender 
upper body and the outline of her breasts, was shown 
in their original article (see image below). 
Divergent Narratives 
Although the dominant narratives discussed here were 
the most consistent in the sources analyzed, they 
are by no means the only narratives that appear in 
Iran’s print media. Looking beyond the six examined 
sources but still within the Iranian print media, one can 
find some diverging narratives. For instance, Ahmad 
Avaei, another member of the National Security and 
Foreign Policy commission, stated in an interview 
with Khabar Online shortly after the initial outbreak 
of demonstrations in Syria that there were similarities 
between Syria and other Arab Spring countries: 
“Freedom and real elections do not exist in this country 
and the minority rules over the majority.”34 Furthermore, 
he asserted, “The reality is that our absolute support 
of Syria was not correct, as the people in this country 
who demonstrated against that regime were religious 
people and the protest movement was spontaneous...” 
31   “Member of parliament’s national security commission: Turbu-
lence in Syria is the West’s scenario for undermining Islamic 
Awakening. (Ozv-e Cmossion-e Amniat-e Melli: Eghteshash dar 
Surieh, Scenario-yeh Gharb baraye Kamrang Kardan-e  Bidari-
e Eslami Ast).” Islamic Republic News Agency. 8 Nov. 2012. 
Online. Accessed 01 Apr. 2013. 
32 “Iran’s Ambassador in Syria: Biased Media Have an Important 
Role (Safir-e Iran Surieh: Resanehha-ye Moghres Dar Havades 
Mantagheh Va Surieh Naghsh Be Seza Darand).” Islamic Re-
public News Agency. 14 Nov. 2012. Online. Accessed 01 Apr. 
2013.
33  “Former CNN Reporter: American media networks make evil 
propaganda against Iran and Syria. (Gozareshgar-e Sabegh-
e CNN: Resaneh Haye Amricayi Tablighat-e Sheitani Alayheh 
Iran va Surieh Mikonand).” Mehr News Agency. 6 October. 
2012. Online. Accessed 03 June 2013.
34 “Member of the National Security Commission: Iran’s Absolute 
Support for Syria Was Not Correct/Libyan Revolutionaries Did 
Not Accept Our Suggestion for Cooperation (Ozv-e Commis-
sion-e Amniat-e Melli: Hemayat-e Motlagh-e Iran Az Surieh 
Dorost Nabud / Enghelabiun Libi Pishnahad-e Hamkari Ma 
Ra Napaziroftand).” Khabar Online. 21 Aug. 2011. Online. Ac-
cessed 01 Apr. 2013.
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However, Avaei was quick to soften his criticism of 
the Syrian regime by saying that unlike the regimes 
of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali or Hosni Mubarak, which 
were dependent on the West, the al-Assad regime is 
independent, supports Hezbollah and is against Israel. 
He maintained that “...America and the West incited 
the demonstrators and by transferring weapons gave 
these events their desired orientation.” 
More typically, however, divergent narratives can 
be found in Iranian print media sources with political 
affiliations outside of the Iranian political elite (e.g. the 
Green Movement) or specialized publications (e.g. 
those focusing on foreign policy). A good example 
of the former is Jaras, a Green Movement-linked 
source, which interviewed dissident senior Reformist 
and former Deputy Interior Minister for Political Affairs 
Mostafa Tajzadeh. In the interview Tajzadeh discusses 
the Syrian conflict, saying that in the context of the 
Arab Spring the Islamic Republic has become a model 
for dictatorships. He continued: 
The largest mistake of the [Iranian] regime 
in the last two years has been [its] absolute 
support of Bashar al-Assad and his criminal 
actions...What is currently happening in Syria, 
and it could have turned out differently with our 
prudence and insight, it’s not only a proxy war in 
which the West (Europe and the United States) 
is arrayed against Russia and China. Rather it 
must be said with deep remorse that it has also 
become a battle between the Shi’a and Sunni.35
According to Tajzadeh, this battle can have negative 
consequences for Muslims, including an increase in 
instability in neighboring states like Iraq and Lebanon 
and the creation of a violent image of Islam and 
Muslims. From Tajzadeh’s point of view, a tarnished 
image of Islam and Muslims also works in favor of 
Israel because it allows Israel to appear as an island of 
stability in an unstable and uncivilized region. 
Iran Diplomacy provides an example of a divergent 
narrative from a specialized publication. Iran Diplomacy 
is a moderate website, associated with former senior 
diplomat Mohammad-Sadegh Kharrazi, in which 
domestically based political scientists and former 
diplomats write on foreign policy issues. In an article 
written shortly after the outbreak of events in Syria, 
Iran’s former cultural attaché in Syria, Mohammad 
Shariati-Dahaghan, wrote an article in which he said 
that Iran should not stand against the Syrian people. 
He stated his belief that through reforms the al-Assad 
regime could have controlled the situation: 
[H]owever we are unfortunately witnessing 
that all of Syria is the scene of the people’s 
opposition and protest, and the (Syrian 
regime’s) accusation of armed rebellion against 
the people has resulted in greater pessimism 
on the part of the people...In terms of our 
[foreign] policy orientation we certainly support 
Syria’s rulers, but let us allow the Syrian people 
themselves make decisions about the [political] 
structure of Syria. Thus, Iran should not act in a 
way in regards to the [Syria’s] political structure 
that it stands against the [Syrian] people.36
CONCLUSION
What can the three dominant narratives found in the 
course of this investigation tell us about the Iranian 
political elite’s perceptions on the Syrian civil war? 
If we take the six selected sources as unreservedly 
expressing the views of their respective political 
affiliations, then we could interpret the dominant 
narratives as showing a high degree of perceptual 
unity among the Iranian political elite on the issue of 
the Syrian civil war. However, given what we know 
about Iranian domestic politics, the Iranian print 
media, and Iran-Syria relations, it is also possible to 
view the narratives as more strongly representing 
the perceptions of the Principalist political grouping, 
especially Neo-Principalists, while marginalizing the 
perceptions of Reformists and Centrists. Regardless 
of which interpretation is true, the elite are publically 
showing a united front on the Syrian conflict, as they 
often do with other foreign policy issues. Even if some 
currents within the elite view what is happening in Syria 
differently than the above narratives, they have kept 
their views private and have not very openly diverged. 
As Centrists and Reformists are marginalized and 
placed outside of the elite in the course of the 2013 
Iranian presidential election, they may more openly 
diverge from the regime’s dominant narratives (much 
as the Green Movement does). 
With regards to the narratives themselves, the third 
narrative, which alleges a Western propaganda 
campaign against the al-Assad regime, appears to be 35  “Tajzadeh to the Leader of the Islamic Republic: In the Arab 
Spring, Iranian Regime Has Become a Model for Dictatorships 
(Tajzadeh Khatab Be Rahbar-e Jomhuri Eslami: Dar Bahar-e 
Arabi Hokumat-e Iran Olgu-ye Hokumatha-ye Dictator Gharar 
Gerefteh Ast).” JARAS.  27 Feb. 2013. Online. Accessed 03 
June 2013.
36 “Iran Should Not Stand against the Syrian People (Iran Mogh-
abl-e Mardom Surieh Gharar Nagirad).” Iran Diplomacy (IRD). 
20 Apr. 2011. Online. Accessed 03 June 2013.
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primarily a case of counter-propaganda. The first two 
narratives, however, may be able to tell us something 
more significant. The first narrative, which states that 
there is an emerging proxy war between two regional 
and international blocs, may indicate that the Iranian 
political elite views regional rivals’ and Western 
actions in Syrian as a kind of red line that has forced a 
response by Iran, China and Russia. From this point of 
view, Iranian political elites may see a new global order 
emerging whereby Western economic and military 
power is increasingly challenged by a rival bloc at the 
regional and international levels. The notion of a proxy 
war may also reveal the Iranian political elite’s concern 
that the Syrian conflict will lead to political instability 
elsewhere in the Middle East and even to interstate 
conflagrations. 
This concern is related to the second narrative, which 
raises the specter of radical Sunni political Islam 
in the Middle East. By repeatedly emphasizing this 
narrative, the print media may be showing the Iranian 
political elite’s anxiety regarding the rise of Sunni 
Islamist regimes. Until very recently, Iran’s position 
as the main proponent of anti-Western political Islam 
was more or less unchallenged. Iran walked a fine 
sectarian line, trying to appeal to both Sunni and Shi’a 
political Islamists. Consequently, both Sunni and Shi’a 
political Islamist groups often looked to Iran for support, 
reinforcing the country’s position and power. The rise 
of radical Arab-Sunni political Islamist groups or states 
that are anti-Iranian, anti-Shi’a and anti-Western could 
seriously undermine Iran’s claim to leadership in the 
Islamic world and change the balance of power in the 
region. 
At the same time, Iranian political elites may see an 
opportunity within the threat. In 1979, revolutionary Iran 
was a revisionist power, and regional and international 
states banded together to neutralize any potential 
Iranian threat. In the post-Arab Spring era, Iran may 
slowly be transforming into a status quo power. The 
second dominant narrative argues that the rise of 
radical Arab-Sunni political Islamist groups or states in 
the region presents a threat not only to Iran, but also 
to the West and Western allies in the Middle East. 
Through this narrative, Iranian political elites may 
be sending subtle signals to the West that there are 
indeed mutual interests between Iran and the West. 
While this is unlikely to translate into any immediate 
political compromises between the two sides, it could 
be a subtle sign that Iran is pondering the changes 
in the regional order and considering areas in which 
mutual interest could lead to greater cooperation with 
the West. 
APPENDIX A: DOMINANT 
NARRATIVE SOURCES
The following sources for the narratives have been 
organized according to their corresponding narrative 
and chronologically.
Note that at the time of publication (during the 2013 
Iranian presidential election), IRNA has been taken 
offline, possibly as a political attack on the Ahmadinejad-
Mashaei Current, and many of the sources used here 
can no longer be retrieved. Dead URLs are a common 
problem when studying Iran using online sources based 
inside the Islamic Republic. As a countermeasure, 
the author has archived articles used in this report 
that were still working at the time of publication. The 
articles cited from IRNA and one article from Khabar 
Online, however, were inaccessible, and URLs are not 
provided below. All other sources are archived with the 
author in .pdf format should they become inaccessible 
in the future. 
Appendix A(1): International 
and Regional Proxy War in  Syria
1. “Supreme leader of the revolution in a ceremony 
commemorating the Imam [Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini’s] death: Exaggerating the danger of 
Iran is a lie. (Rahbar-e Moazzam- Enghelab dar 
Salgard-e Ertehal-e Emam: Bozorg Namayi Kha-
tar-e Iran-e Hasteh-i, Dorughi Bish Nist).” Shargh 
Newspaper. 5 June 2012. Online. Accessed 03 
June 2013.
2. ““Shi’a Threat” Is an Excuse for Interference from 
outside of the Region (“Khatar Shi’e” Bahaneh-ye 
Dekhalat-e Keshvarha-ye Fara Mantagheh Ast).” 
Shargh Newspaper. 3 July 2011. Online. Accessed 
03 June 2013.
3. “Xinhua: Syrian Crisis Is a Proxy War, Not a War 
between the [Syrian] Government and People. 
(Xinhua: Bohran-e Surieh Jang-e Niabati Ast Na 
Jang-e Mian-e Mardom va Dolat).” Fars News 
Agency. 8 July 2012. Online. Accessed 03 June 
2013.
4. Borumand, Hesam-Aldin “Two times two does not 
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